Military History Strategy

War-game simulation specialists James F. Dunnigan and Austin Bay have revised their highly regarded analyses, bringing up to date not only the many conventional conflicts around the world today but the new battlegrounds that have emerged since the previous edition was published more than a decade ago - the Global War on Terror, counterinsurgency struggles around the world and the latest frontier of modern combat: cyber war.

Civil Air Transport (CAT), founded in China after World War II by Claire Chennault and Whiting Willauer, was initially a commercial carrier specializing in air freight. Its role quickly changed as CAT became first a paramilitary adjunct of the Nationalist Chinese Air Force, then the CIA's secret "air force" in Korea, then "the most shot-at airline in the world" in French Indochina, and eventually becoming reorganized as Air America at the height of the Vietnam War.

In an increasingly urbanized world, urban terrain has become a greater factor in military operations. Simultaneously, advances in military technology have given military forces sharply increased capabilities. The conflict comes from how urban terrain can negate or degrade many of those increased capabilities. What happens when advanced weapons are used in a close-range urban fight with an abundance of cover? Storming the City analyzes the performance of the US Army and US Marine Corps in urban combat in four major urban battles of the mid-20th century.

World War II was a media war. President Franklin D. Roosevelt used the press to a great extent, of course, but as the war progressed, the media also came to influence commanders' decisions on the battlefield. The Media Offensive offers a new way to understand military-media relations during World War II. The press and public opinion shaped not only how the conflict was seen but also how it was fought. In what could be called "the new history of war reporting," the focus is switched from how the military controlled reporters to how military decisions were shaped by the press.

In 1941, the Second World War became global, when Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union, Japan attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor and Germany declared war on the United States. In this timely book, which fills a real gap, Black engages with the strategic issues of the time - as they developed chronologically and interacted - and relates these to subsequent debates about the choices made, revealing their continued political resonances.

Milenar tratado militar de Sun Tzu, A Arte da Guerra é tão compreensível e atual que se tornou um texto clássico. Acredita-se, inclusive, que o livro tenha sido usado ao longo dos tempos por estrategistas militares como Napoleão, Adolf Hitler e Mao Tse Tung. Hoje, o livro migrou das estantes dos estrategistas para a dos economistas, administradores, políticos, vendedores, empresários e todos aqueles cuja meta é a vitória – em todos os níveis.

Gavin reassesses the strategy of flexible response, the influence of nuclear weapons during the Berlin Crisis, the origins of and motivations for US nuclear nonproliferation policy, and how to assess the nuclear dangers we face today. Archival evidence makes it clear that decision makers were more concerned about underlying geopolitical questions than about the strategic dynamic between two nuclear superpowers.

Who hasn't dreamed of one day ruling your own country? Along with great power comes unlimited influence, control, admiration, and often wealth. How to Be a Dictator will teach you the tricks of the trade - how to rise to the top and stay in power, and how to enjoy the fruits of your excellence.

In the early 1970s, as US combat forces began to withdraw from Southeast Asia, South Vietnamese and Cambodian forces continued the fight against the People's Army of Vietnam and the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, more commonly known as the Viet Cong. Despite the evacuation of its ground troops, the United States promised to materially support its allies' struggle against communist aggression.

Alexander the Great endures as one of the most admired and emulated leaders in world history. In our time, his example of unprecedented and unparalleled success has inspired leaders of business and government, from media mogul Ted Turner (who keeps a bronze bust of Alexander in his office) to Desert Storm commander General Norman Schwarzkopf (who credits Alexander's tactical innovations for his dramatic flanking maneuver against the Iraqi army in the liberation of Kuwait).

One of the best selling History titles of 2009. Examining the Second World War on every front, Andrew Roberts asks whether, with a different decision-making process and a different strategy, Hitler’s Axis might even have won. Were those German generals who blamed everything on Hitler after the war correct, or were they merely scapegoating their former Führer once he was safely beyond defending himself?

In five case studies of US Army doctrine, Campbell pits military realism against bureaucratic and cultural perspectives in three key areas - nuclear versus conventional warfare, preferences for offense versus defense, and COIN missions - and finds that the army has been more doctrinally flexible than those perspectives would predict. He demonstrates that decision makers, while vowing in the wake of Vietnam to avoid (COIN) missions, nonetheless found themselves adapting to the geopolitical realities of fighting “low intensity” conflicts.

Describing Russian Infantry’s Breaching and Clearing Techniques - Breaching entryways and clearing buildings, particularly in urban combat, are particularly complex and dangerous infantry tasks. ATP 7-100.1 describes Russian tactics for use in Army training, professional education, and leader development. This document is part of the ATP 7-100 series that addresses a nation-state’s military doctrine with a focus on army ground forces and tactical operations in offense, defense, and related mission sets.

Bringing together 10 eminent Revolutionary War experts, editor Ed Lengel presents their stirring narratives of the military campaigns that changed history and gave birth to a new nation. These historians guide you through the fateful decade of the 1770s in British America. In 1776, you battle in Brooklyn Heights, then cross the Delaware with Washington. In the late summer and fall of '77, you bushwhack down the Champlain Valley with Johnny Burgoyne. You struggle through winter with Washington and his beleaguered troops in Valley Forge.

Why does mission command matter to maneuver leaders? The past decade of war has reinforced the importance of mission command as small units conduct decentralized operations across wide areas in rapidly changing environments. Operations are complex, involving continuous interactions between friendly forces, enemy organizations, and civilians, as well as interaction with other factors that affect the mission such as time, terrain, and local political dynamics. Simply giving subordinates task and purpose is not enough for effective mission command.

More than 2,000 years ago the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu advised us to know our enemies. The question has always been how. In A Sense of the Enemy, the historian Zachary Shore demonstrates that leaders can best understand an opponent not simply from his pattern of past behavior, but from his behavior at pattern breaks. Meaningful pattern breaks occur during dramatic deviations from the routine, when the enemy imposes costs upon himself. It's at these unexpected moments, Shore explains, that successful leaders can learn what makes their rivals truly tick.

Possibly the foremost classic of military strategy. The Art of War was written by Sun Tzu (Sunzi, Sun Wu), a quasi-legendary figure. The work dates from the 6th to the 3rd century BCE. It is known worldwide as required reading for students of political and military science and history. Most editions of this work include a great amount of commentary from various editors, making the work more difficult to understand. We have dispensed with that here, and only include the core treatise in straightforward, modern prose.

I was in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam. 1968. The Viet Cong had successfully ambushed every other US and South Vietnamese military unit. We were next. I had been to Ranger School and had learned all about ambushes (that is what Rangers do!). My men and I set up convoy procedures to protect ourselves. It worked, and the enemy grew so frustrated at their inability to ambush my daily convoy that they placed a bounty on my head. I was the only US Army officer within 50 miles to have this dubious distinction. But it served as a great reminder that our defense against ambushes was working. And we ...

Most histories of the US Army in World War II view the Mediterranean Theater of Operations primarily as a deadly training ground for very green forces, where lessons learned on the beaches of Oran, in the hills of the Kasserine Pass area, and at the collapse of the Tunis bridgehead all contributed to later success in Western Europe. Steven Barry, however, contends that victory in the MTO would not have materialized without the leadership of battalion-level commanders. They operated at a high level, despite the lack of combat experience for themselves and their troops.

This study of Soviet tank company tactics is written as a "how they fight" manual. While this report is somewhat dated, I believe the basic underlying tactics have been adopted by the Russian New Look reforms and help define Russian military modernization ambitions. Naturally the use of new technologies will complicate the battlespace. However, in the final analysis, somebody will have to get into a tank and wade into the fray, guns blasting. How the Soviets did that in the past - knowing what works and what doesn't - is bound to affect their approach to combat today.