Episodios

  • CRE’s Next Threat: Uninsurable Assets

    CRE’s Next Threat: Uninsurable Assets
    Jul 15 2025
    The Uninsurable Future: How Climate-Driven Insurance Risk is Reshaping Real Estate The Canary in the CRE Coal Mine If insurance is the canary in the coal mine for climate risk, then the bird has stopped singing. That’s the warning from Dave Jones, former California Insurance Commissioner and current Director of the Climate Risk Initiative at UC Berkeley. In a conversation that touches on reinsurance markets, mortgage delinquencies, lender behavior, and regulatory dysfunction, Jones laid out the most sobering climate-related CRE risk analysis to date: we are already living through a systemic insurance crisis—and commercial real estate is not exempt. “We are marching steadily towards an uninsurable areas in this country,” Jones warns. From Homeowners to High-Rises: What the Data Shows Much of the early distress has been observed in the residential and small business markets, where data is more publicly available. A study by the Dallas Fed, cited by Jones, found a direct correlation between areas hardest hit by climate events and surging insurance premiums, non-renewals, and mortgage delinquencies. But commercial real estate isn’t insulated. While pricing data is less transparent due to looser filing requirements, Jones states, “everything that I’ve seen indicates that those [commercial] rates are going up too,” particularly in regions where catastrophic climate events are becoming more frequent and severe. Take Florida. One of our clients’ office tower's premiums jumped from $300,000 to $1.2 million in a single renewal cycle. That’s straight off the bottom line. The hit is entirely non-accretive; it’s pure cost. The Feedback Loop: Insurance, Lending, and Liquidity As insurance availability shrinks and prices soar, lending dries up. Lenders want to see that there is property and casualty insurance yet, as it becomes harder to get, that has implications in credit markets… and flow-through implications to the real economy. It’s not just anecdotal. Jones references studies showing that banks are offloading loans insured by lower-rated, higher-risk insurers to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, effectively shifting the risk onto taxpayers. That means if a hurricane hits and the house is knocked down, there isn’t insurance available, potentially because the insurance company went insolvent. The trend is clear: insurance stress is bleeding into credit markets and weakening the foundations of the entire real estate financing stack. The “Deregulation” Illusion Some states, like Florida, are trying to respond by loosening regulatory constraints to attract insurers. Jones is skeptical. “Florida rates are four times the national average,” he says. The state has adopted taxpayer-funded reinsurance schemes, weakened litigation protections, and allowed less-robust rating agencies to operate. Still, “the national branded home insurers are not writing in Florida… they can’t make a profit,” says Jones. “So even with all these changes, the background risk is too great.” In short: deregulation cannot solve a fundamentally unprofitable underwriting environment driven by climate volatility. Adaptation Isn’t Being Priced In - Yet Jones is more optimistic about resilience measures. Home hardening, defensible space, and forest management, especially in wildfire-prone states like California, can materially reduce losses. Commercial insurers often have engineering staff to assess and recommend these strategies. But the industry hasn’t kept pace. “Insurers, by and large, are not accounting for property, community, and landscape-scale adaptation and resilience in their models,” Jones says. One exception is Colorado, which passed a law requiring insurers to factor in proven risk mitigation. This could prove to be a model for commercial markets, but it’s early and insurers remain price takers in the face of mounting losses. From Reinsurance to Municipal Bonds: Signals to Watch What market signals should CRE investors monitor? Jones suggests: Insurance pricing and non-renewals: leading indicators of distress. Reinsurance costs: though recently softening, they’ve trended upward for years. Lender behavior: especially offloading risky loans to agencies. Rating agency downgrades: particularly for municipalities facing severe climate risk. Housing market mispricing: First Street Foundation estimates as much as $1 trillion in residential overvaluation due to underpriced climate risk. Any of these could tip the balance in specific markets or signal a broader inflection point. A Slow Collapse or a Sudden Shock? Is this a long-term crisis or a fast-moving one? “It’s happening in real time now,” says Jones. “It’s more likely that this will be a steady glide into uninsurability… as opposed to one catastrophic event that brings the whole house of cards down.” Still, the metaphor is ...
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    52 m
  • Supply, Stalemate, and Strategy

    Supply, Stalemate, and Strategy
    Jul 2 2025
    Supply, Stalemate, and Strategy: A Data-Centric View on U.S. Housing with Chris Nebenzahl Locked-In America: The Housing Market’s Great Stall The U.S. housing market isn’t just tight, it’s inert. As Chris Nebenzahl, Housing Economist at John Burns Research and Consulting, puts it, America is experiencing a “lock-in effect” where millions of homeowners, beneficiaries of sub-3% mortgages from a prior era, have no incentive to move. Transactions, both in the for-sale and rental segments, are stalling. Inventory is constrained by economic rationality, not lack of demand. “The housing market thrives on constant moves,” Nebenzahl says. “But right now, across the housing spectrum, people are locked in.” The result: record-low turnover in single-family and multifamily rentals, with occupancy propped up by immobility rather than expansion. In such a frozen ecosystem, prices remain surprisingly buoyant despite high rates – a divergence from textbook supply-demand dynamics. The 5.5% Mortgage Threshold: A Reopening Trigger? The most actionable insight from Nebenzahl’s research: housing won’t truly unfreeze until mortgage rates return to a “magic number” of approximately 5.5%. That’s the psychological and financial line at which the lock-in effect starts to meaningfully ease, based on historical demand models and borrower behavior. With mortgage rates stuck between 6.5% and 7.5%, this still feels a long way off. Until that number is achieved, or until housing prices decline significantly, mobility will remain stifled. Notably, certain regions such as Florida, Texas, Arizona, and Tennessee are already seeing modest price declines, indicating that some pressure is starting to break through. But Nebenzahl is clear: this isn’t a repeat of 2008. “Nationwide, I think we’ll see maybe a 1–2% decline in home values. We’re nowhere near GFC territory,” he says. The real estate crash of yesteryear was a systemic event; today’s stalling is more friction than fissure. Bifurcation in Geography and Performance The story of U.S. housing is increasingly one of regional divergence. “It’s a tale of two markets,” Nebenzahl observes. Northeast, Midwest, parts of the West Coast: Supply remains tight, pricing is stable or even rising, and rent growth is positive particularly in cities like Boston, Chicago, and San Francisco. Sunbelt metros like Austin, Dallas, Denver, Nashville: Facing ongoing rent declines and incentives as a wave of multifamily supply catches up with (and briefly outpaces) demand. What’s driving this? In one word: inventory. “Austin, for example, has seen the most supply as a percentage of existing stock. That’s softened rents, even though demand remains strong.” The Quiet Strength of Rentals Despite oversupply in some markets, multifamily is holding up. Rents have stabilized, absorption remains healthy, and rent-to-income ratios are generally favorable. Nationwide, that ratio sits around 25%, well below the 30% threshold for ‘rent burden.’ Even in supply-saturated markets like Austin, ratios hover near 20%, laying a foundation for recovery. Why this resilience? A few reasons: Affordability gap: With for-sale housing out of reach for many due to both price and interest rates, renting becomes the only viable option. Mobility hedge: In uncertain economic times, the flexibility of a 12-month lease is more appealing than a 30-year mortgage. Demographic tailwinds: New household formation, though potentially threatened by labor market softness, is still skewing towards rentals. “The lion’s share of household formation is going into rental,” Nebenzahl says. “Because of affordability challenges, and because people are hesitant to make long-term commitments.” Cracks in the Foundation: Where Distress May Surface Still, there are stress points, especially in assets underwritten in the froth of 2021. “I’d be watching older vintage assets in oversupplied markets,” he says. “Many of those were acquired with floating rate debt and pro formas that didn’t anticipate interest rates going from 0% to 5.5% overnight.” These deals are now colliding with debt maturities, declining rents, and underwriting models that assumed permanent appreciation. That said, he does not forecast widespread defaults – more likely, selective distress in marginal players. Risks on the Horizon: Immigration, Labor, and Fragility Beyond rates and rent rolls, Nebenzahl highlights three structural risks that CRE professionals should monitor closely: Immigration policy: Rental demand and construction labor both depend heavily on immigrant populations. Recent restrictions, including H1-B visa tightening and deportations, have had a measurable cooling effect. “Immigrants rent across the income spectrum,” he notes. “A slowdown hits both the demand side and the build (supply) side.” Aging trades ...
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    57 m
  • Navigating Risk, Noise, and Uncertainty

    Navigating Risk, Noise, and Uncertainty
    Jun 25 2025
    Navigating Risk, Noise, and Uncertainty: Barry Ritholtz on Investing in a Volatile World In my conversation with Barry Ritholtz, chairman of Ritholtz Wealth Management and host of Bloomberg’s “Masters in Business” podcast, we explored market and real estate cycles, caution, and capital allocation in today’s increasingly unpredictable economic environment. Below are the most actionable and provocative takeaways for real estate investors, both passive and professional, drawn from Barry’s decades of lessons and market observations. Origins of Insight: From Blog to Bloomberg Ritholtz didn’t set out to run a multi-billion-dollar firm. What started as daily trading notes eventually evolved into a blog, a book, Bailout Nation, and a platform that positioned him to correctly call both the top and bottom of the 2008 financial crisis. This journey, grounded in curiosity and behavioral finance, shaped the contrarian and data-driven approach he still employs today. "I just wanted to know why some people made money while others didn’t doing the same thing." The 2008 Playbook: Behavioral Edge Over Economic Models Ritholtz attributes his early warning of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) to non-traditional thinking and real estate roots (his mother was a real estate agent). Observing abnormal refinancing activity and "cash-out mania" led him to investigate securitized debt and derivative risk, well before it was mainstream. He reverse-engineered risk from Reinhart & Rogoff’s crisis research and famously predicted the Dow’s decline to ~6,800—earning mockery initially, then vindication. Echoes of 2008? Why This Time Feels Precarious While he stops short of predicting a crisis, Ritholtz allows for a 10–15% probability of a self-inflicted depression – a worst-case scenario rooted not in structural weakness, but political mismanagement. “It [is an] asymmetrical risk to take one bullet, put it in a six shooter, spin the wheel, and put it up against your head with a $28 trillion economy.” From tariffs to immigration policy to fiscal gamesmanship, Ritholtz sees signs that the U.S. may be eroding the long-standing trust that underpins reserve currency status and global capital flows. Cash Isn’t a Plan, Discipline Is When asked whether it makes sense to sit in cash and wait out the next downturn, Ritholtz counters with behavioral caution. Historically, those who “go to cash” rarely reenter at the right time and often miss the rebound entirely. “If you're going to sit out in cash, do you have the temperament, the discipline to get back in?” Instead, he recommends building resilience: modest leverage, long-term focus, and capital efficiency – hallmarks of legends like Sam Zell, who Ritholtz holds up as a model of disciplined real estate investing. A Word on Leverage: Use with Extreme Care High leverage is the common thread in stories of ruin. Ritholtz referenced the downfall of the Peloton CEO, who borrowed heavily against inflated stock. The same caution applies to over-leveraged real estate investors, especially those who haven’t endured a full cycle. “Market crashes are where capital returns to its rightful owners.” For CRE sponsors, now is the time to refinance where possible, preserve cash, and maintain flexibility, even if that means lower IRR projections. How to Filter the Noise: Create an Information Diet Ritholtz emphasized the need to tune out “financial candy from strangers” – the firehose of social media, Substacks, and hot takes by unvetted commentators. “They don’t know your zip code, your goals, your tax bracket. Why would you trust them?” He recommends identifying a shortlist of credible voices with defined, rational processes and a record of sound judgment. “Build your A-Team,” he advises. “Then ignore the rest.” Real Estate Today: Not Monolithic, but Multifaceted Unlike equities, real estate behaves very differently depending on location, asset class, and capital structure. While some sectors (e.g., Class B office) remain distressed, others (e.g., data centers, multifamily in select markets, industrial) are faring relatively well. “Literally, there are properties [Zell] held for half a century. He was long term… used modest amounts of leverage, and he bought great properties at even better prices.” Ritholtz warns against painting real estate with a broad brush and urges nuanced thinking about cycles, risk-adjusted return, and operator quality. Sentiment vs. Signals: What to Watch Now While he downplays the predictive power of investor sentiment, Ritholtz monitors: Three-month moving averages of non-farm payrolls Rounded tops in S&P earnings trends Residential real estate supply conditions in key metros Dollar strength (as a proxy for confidence and capital flows) “If the dollar keeps falling and supply starts rising in ...
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    1 h y 20 m
  • Bracing for the Real Estate Bang

    Bracing for the Real Estate Bang
    Jun 10 2025
    The Looming Crisis Few Want to Confront Paul Daneshrad, CEO of StarPoint Properties and author of Money and Morons, is sounding the alarm: the United States is barreling toward a sovereign debt reckoning – and real estate professionals are not nearly prepared. Citing economists Reinhart and Rogoff, along with voices as diverse as Jamie Dimon, Jerome Powell, and Ray Dalio, Daneshrad warns that the U.S. has not only crossed the 100% debt-to-GDP threshold, widely viewed as a critical danger zone, but has kept accelerating. "We're at 120 to 140% on-balance-sheet," he notes. "If you include off-balance-sheet liabilities, we're at 300%." While the exact timing of the crisis is unknowable, Daneshrad argues that its inevitability is not. “It’s not a question of if – it’s when.” Politics, Populism, and Normalcy Bias Daneshrad is quick to dismiss the conventional partisan narrative. The deficit is no longer a left-right issue, it’s a bipartisan affliction. Both political parties, he argues, are fueling structural imbalances. Worse, the electorate, while voicing concern, refuses to vote for hard choices. This disconnect is the heart of his book’s provocative title: Money and Morons. “86% of Americans say they’re worried about the debt,” he says. “But they won’t vote for politicians willing to solve it, because that solution involves pain.” The result is what psychologists call “normalcy bias” – an instinct to ignore looming threats and retreat into the comfort of the familiar. Fixed-Rate Fortresses: Real Estate’s First Line of Defense If the debt crisis triggers hyperinflation and a spike in interest rates, as Daneshrad expects, the implications for real estate will be seismic. His response? Radical preparation. StarPoint has already begun shifting its portfolio into 20+ year fixed-rate debt and is moving toward 30-year structures. “It’s painful. It’s more expensive. But if the crisis comes in eight years, and you’ve got two years left on a 10-year loan, you’re vulnerable.” He emphasizes that this is not a fringe view. “Even Powell, whose mandate doesn’t include the deficit, felt compelled to warn the public. That’s how serious it is.” Deleveraging with Purpose Debt levels at StarPoint are also coming down – fast. The firm is targeting 40% leverage, down from a peak of 70%. They currently sit at 54%, and the journey continues. The rationale is clear: when interest rates jump from 6% to 15%, the re-pricing of real estate will be brutal. “That’s trillions in lost value,” says Daneshrad. “You have to de-risk now.” The Forgotten Asset: Cash Cash, often derided for its lack of yield in boom times, plays a central role in Daneshrad’s playbook. “The Rockefellers, Kennedys, Guggenheims – they had cash when it mattered. They bought at two cents on the dollar.” Berkshire Hathaway’s record cash holdings reinforce this strategy. “Buffett sees limited opportunity right now and high risk. That should tell you something.” Daneshrad recommends targeting cash reserves as a percentage of either AUM or annual free cash flow, steadily building them over time. "Public companies get punished for it. Private firms like ours have more flexibility and we’re using it." Why He’s Not Buying (Yet) Despite market dislocation, Daneshrad says StarPoint is mostly sitting on the sidelines. Cap rate spreads don’t justify the risk, and few deals offer the deep value he’s targeting. “We’re looking for rebound plays where sellers are on their third buyer and need certainty of close. That’s where the discounts are. But those opportunities are rare.” Asked whether the mispricing stems from short-term underwriting or optimism bias, he shrugs. “We’ve flooded the system with liquidity. Asset prices are artificially propped up.” Diversification and the Limits of Real Estate Daneshrad is not betting the farm on U.S. real estate. He’s pursuing modest geographic diversification abroad and expanding into non-real estate asset classes. “Historically, real estate hedges inflation well but a debt crisis changes everything.” He’s candid about the difficulty: “We’re not that smart. Timing a crisis is hard. But we can prepare for one.” The Aging America Conundrum One of the more nuanced points Daneshrad raises is the intersection of demography and fiscal sustainability. Aging, he agrees, is inevitable. But the care infrastructure it requires is not financially supported. “The trustees for Social Security and Medicare, not politicians, say the funds go bankrupt in under ten years. That’s $90 trillion in off-balance-sheet liabilities.” Senior housing? “A great idea if the elderly can pay. But with savings rates at historic lows, I’m not optimistic.” Market Signals That Matter Daneshrad watches for three early signs of crisis: A ...
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    45 m
  • The Crash You Won’t See Coming — Because It’s Already Started

    The Crash You Won’t See Coming — Because It’s Already Started
    Jun 5 2025
    The Real Estate Cycle: A Warning for 2026 Insights from Phil Anderson on the Coming Real Estate Market Crash In my conversation with renowned economist Phil Anderson, you will gain unprecedented insight into the mechanics of real estate cycles and why we are right on the precipice of the next major real estate market crash. Anderson, author of "The Secret Life of Real Estate and Banking," presents a compelling case that combines economic theory with historical precedent to paint a picture of where we stand today – and where we’re headed tomorrow. The Foundation: Understanding Economic Rent The Law That Economics Forgot To understand the thesis, here’s a powerful analogy: just as we accept the law of gravity dictates that a dropped pencil will fall to the ground, there exists an equally immutable economic law that has been largely forgotten. Anderson calls this the "law of economic rent" and it’s the principle that all of society's gains and benefits will ultimately gravitate toward land prices. This fundamental concept explains why we experience predictable real estate cycles. When society allows land earnings to capitalize into prices (typically representing 20 years of earnings), and banks are permitted to extend credit based on those inflated prices, a real estate cycle crash becomes inevitable. It's not a possibility – it's a mathematical certainty. The Erasure of Land from Economics Anderson reveals a crucial historical shift that occurred after World War I. Prior to 1907, economists universally recognized three factors of production: labor, capital, and land. However, as land reform movements gained momentum and threatened established interests, there was a deliberate effort to remove land from economic textbooks entirely. Today's economists learn only about labor and capital, treating land as merely another form of capital. This fundamental misunderstanding, Anderson argues, is why virtually no mainstream economists saw the 2008 financial crisis coming, nor will they recognize the signs of the coming downturn. The Cycle Mechanics: Why 18-20 Years? Historical Reliability The 18-20 year real estate cycle has been remarkably consistent throughout American history, documented back to 1800. Anderson traces this pattern through every major economic downturn: the 1920s, early 1970s, 1991, and 2008. In each case, the proximate cause wasn't what most economists claimed – it was the deflation of land prices. The current cycle began in 2012, marking the bottom of the last downturn. We are now in year 13 of the cycle, approaching the critical 14-year mark that historically signals the beginning of the end. Here’s how it works: The Anatomy of a Cycle Anderson explains that real estate cycles run like this: The cycle is 18.6 years on average - "14 years up and 4 years down" 2012 was the bottom - Land prices peaked in 2006-2007, then had approximately 4 years down to the 2012 bottom 2026 is the projected peak - As Anderson states: "14 years up from there [2012] takes you to 2026. It really is that simple." We're currently in year 13 - From 2012 bottom + 13 years = 2025, approaching the 14-year peak in 2026 Years 13-14 are the "Winner's Curse" - The final speculative phase when "animal spirits are truly unleashed." Current Position in the Cycle This precise timing explains why Anderson identifies us as being in "the last couple of years of the cycle." All the current signals he observes - housing stocks rolling over, banking deregulation beginning, frenzied speculation in Bitcoin and cryptocurrency - point to our approach toward the 2026 peak rather than suggesting we've already arrived there. The critical insight is that we're in the dangerous final speculation phase right now. We're experiencing what Anderson calls the "Winner's Curse" period of years 13-14, when speculation reaches fever pitch and "animal spirits are truly unleashed." The peak is expected in 2026, which would then trigger the inevitable 4-year down phase running from 2026-2030. This timeline explains why Anderson emphasizes the urgency of preparation - we're not looking at some distant future event, but rather a cyclical turning point that's rapidly approaching and may have already begun. Presidential Patterns: The Republican Connection A Striking Historical Correlation One of Anderson's most intriguing observations concerns presidential politics. Since Abraham Lincoln's era, every final phase of a real estate cycle has coincided with a Republican president taking office. These aren't coincidences but reflect the political dynamics that emerge during speculative bubbles. Anderson notes the historical bookend: George Washington, the first president and America's largest landowner at the time, and now Donald Trump, the 47th president and a prominent real estate developer, both representing the connection between land ownership and ...
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    59 m
  • Real Estate's Margin for Error is Gone

    Real Estate's Margin for Error is Gone
    Jun 4 2025
    The Margin of Error Has Vanished: What CRE Investors Should Be Watching Now Commentary on a conversation with John Chang, Senior Vice President and National Director, Research and Advisory Services, Marcus & Millichap The New CRE Investment Mandate: Survive First, Then Thrive “The margin of error has narrowed to virtually zero.” This was John Chang’s stark assessment of today’s commercial real estate environment – an era marked by fragile capital markets, rising Treasury yields, policy instability, and speculative hangovers from a decade of cheap money. According to Chang, the headline playbook hasn’t changed: keep leverage low, maintain reserves, underwrite for downside. But the stakes have changed. What used to be prudent is now required. Those who forget that, particularly those lulled by the long post-GFC bull run, risk extinction. Cap Rates, Treasury Yields, and the Compressed Spread A central theme of our conversation is the vanishing spread between borrowing costs and asset yields. Cap rates have risen 100–200 bps depending on asset class and geography, but Treasury rates have risen more. That’s compressed spreads, rendering most acquisitions reliant on a value-creation story or an eventual rate reversal. Investors are still transacting, says Chang, but only if they believe they can bridge the spread gap through operational improvements i.e. leasing, renovation, management upgrades. Passive cap-rate arbitrage is no longer viable. “The potential for something to go wrong is high,” Chang warns, especially in a policy environment that remains erratic. The Treasury Market’s Imminent Supply Shock Chang outlines why he expects upward pressure on Treasury yields for the balance of the year – contrary to the market's general expectations of rate cuts. Key reasons: Federal Deficits: With a delayed budget, Treasury issuance has been running below historical norms. That’s about to reverse, with $1–1.5 trillion in supply expected by October. Shrinking Buyer Base: The Fed is reducing its balance sheet. Foreign holders, especially China and Japan, are net sellers. Even traditional allies are showing less appetite, driven partly by frictions over U.S. trade policy. Trade Tensions: Tariffs of up to 145% on imports from China, EU saber-rattling, and a broad retreat from globalization are alienating the very buyers of U.S. debt. “People don’t want to do us any favors right now,” Chang says. “That uncertainty alone elevates risk premiums.” Normalcy Bias and the Myth of the Perpetual Up Cycle Chang pulls no punches on the market psychology underpinning risky underwriting in recent years. He describes a bifurcated investor landscape: Those who entered post-GFC and think 2–3% interest rates and infinite rent growth are normal. Veterans of the 1990s S&L crisis, the dot-com bust, or the GFC, who know better. What’s striking is the lack of long-term data. Even Marcus & Millichap, he notes, only has robust CRE data going back to 2000. Without context, many have mistaken the tailwind-fueled 2010s as a standard baseline. “We’re back to old-world real estate,” Chang says. “Where you have to actually understand the property, the tenant mix, the microeconomics of location. The era of pure financial engineering is over.” Lessons from the Pandemic and GFC: Underwrite for Downside, Not for Hype Chang recounts closing on an investment in April 2020 at the very onset of pandemic uncertainty. “What if we rent at breakeven?” he asked. If the answer was yes, he proceeded. That conservative approach worked then and still applies today. The biggest blow-ups, he says, came from sponsors who: Modeled double-digit rent growth. Over-leveraged. Used floating-rate debt without hedges. Ignored capex and reserves. By contrast, Chang praises sponsors who locked in fixed debt, kept leverage under 65%, and stayed humble. “They’re embarrassed to be earning 7% IRRs,” he jokes, “but in this climate, that’s a win.” Washout in the Syndication Space: Good Riddance? Perhaps most damning is Chang’s commentary on the wave of underqualified syndicators who entered during the boom years. “Thousands came in with no operating experience,” he says, pointing to the proliferation of coaching programs offering checklists instead of expertise. These new entrants mimicked industry language – AUM figures, fund manager titles – but often had no institutional track record or risk management skills. Many of them, Chang believes, are now out or on their way out. And while some may return with hard-earned wisdom, he expects the flow of “tourists” into the syndication world to dry up for the foreseeable future. Tailwinds Still Exist: But Only for the Well-Prepared Despite the short-term risks, Chang sees multiple long-term tailwinds: Demographics: Millennials are delaying homeownership, renting ...
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    59 m
  • Real Estate's #1 Rule: Don't Lose Money!

    Real Estate's #1 Rule: Don't Lose Money!
    Jun 2 2025
    Leyla Kunimoto brings a rare and unfiltered perspective to today’s commercial real estate conversation: that of a full-time individual LP who writes publicly about her investment decisions. She’s not a sponsor, a capital raiser, or a fund manager; she’s an investor allocating her own capital and speaking candidly about what she sees in the market. Through her newsletter Accredited Investor Insights, Leyla connects with hundreds of other LPs and GPs, giving her a uniquely well-informed view of how sentiment is shifting, how sponsors are adapting (or not), and why many individual investors, herself included, are taking a more cautious, capital-preserving stance in the current environment. Track Records Are the New Credentials Leyla made one thing immediately clear in my conversation with her: experience across market cycles matters more than ever. Sponsors who lived through the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), and made it out intact, view the world differently. “There’s a certain level of conservatism they develop,” she said, that translates into more disciplined underwriting, more thoughtful pacing, and fewer emotionally driven decisions. This stands in sharp contrast to what Leyla observed in 2020, when billboards at Dallas airports advertised real estate masterminds promising to teach people how to raise capital fast. She watched sponsors pile into deals with razor-thin margins, driven more by optimism than fundamentals. Some of those same players are now facing tough questions from investors. Tariffs Are Already Affecting CRE in Two Big Ways While many LPs focus on interest rates, Leyla highlighted tariffs as a macro driver that’s beginning to affect commercial real estate, particularly in development. First, tariffs are raising costs on imported materials, like lumber, pushing construction budgets higher. Second, she’s watching what tariffs could mean for demand in the industrial sector. “If trade with Mexico declines, what happens to logistics facilities near the border?” she asked. Conversely, if reshoring takes off, we may see demand rise for inland warehouse space. It’s a nuanced picture and one that sponsors in ground-up deals can’t afford to ignore. Equity Is Cautious. Retail Capital Is Now in Play. Another shift Leyla is tracking is on the capital side. Institutional equity has pulled back in many corners of the market, and some sponsors are turning to retail LPs for the first time. But this isn’t an easy pivot. “Retail investors are expensive to reach,” she said. They also tend to ask more questions – and now, they’re more skeptical. Many LPs are sitting on deals that aren’t performing. As a result, the bar for new allocations is much higher. “There’s a sense of caution,” she noted. “LPs aren’t allocating blindly anymore.” Floating Rate Debt Divides the Market Leyla sees a bifurcated sponsor landscape: those who are still dealing with the aftermath of floating-rate debt, and those who have the capital and flexibility to transact but can’t find deals that pencil. Sponsors with legacy floating-rate loans are focused on rate caps and marginal cash flow. They’re rooting for the Fed to cut rates. Others are hunting for acquisitions, but the math isn’t working. “Without aggressive assumptions, most deals don’t pencil,” she said. The IRR Illusion: What LPs Should Actually Be Watching Many sponsors still lead with IRR projections, but Leyla has shifted her mindset. “I don’t screen for how much money I’m going to make. I don’t screen for the IRR probability,” she told me, “the only thing I’m laser beam focused on when I evaluate private placement deals is the probability of losing money.” That loss-aversion lens changes everything. She believes LPs are better off compounding modest, positive returns over time than chasing double-digit IRRs that come with a real chance of loss. “Making 3-4% positive IRR for 10 years straight outperforms hitting 20% on some deals and going to zero on others,” she said. Stress Tests Are Private. Optimism Is Public. Behind closed doors, sponsors are more conservative than they let on, she says. The real pros run multiple models – best, worst, and most likely scenarios. “I always ask for stress test scenarios underwritten to the GFC,” she says, continuing that she used to hear sponsors saying such scenarios were never going to play out because the underwriting is too stringent. “I’m hearing a little bit less of that now,” she says. Still, she’s skeptical of any deck that doesn’t acknowledge the possibility of a rent decline. Of course deals won’t pencil if you underwrite to a 10% rent drop but, in some markets, that’s exactly what’s happening. Cash Is a Position. Waiting Is a Strategy. When I asked what she’d do if handed a $1 million windfall today, Leyla didn’t hesitate: “I’d keep it in ...
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    39 m
  • How to Survive the Coming Real Estate Storm

    How to Survive the Coming Real Estate Storm
    May 30 2025
    How to Survive the Coming Real Estate Storm – What Sean Kelly-Rand Learned at Lehman For the experienced real estate investor or sponsor, this is a masterclass in what really matters. When Lehman Brothers unraveled in 2008, it exposed a truth that many in the real estate world still prefer to ignore: even the most sophisticated capital structures can implode when the cost of capital and access to liquidity are misunderstood – or worse, taken for granted. My podcast/YouTube show guest today, Sean Kelly-Rand, didn’t just watch that collapse unfold; he lived through it from inside and the playbook he uses today as the managing partner of RD Advisors is shaped, in part, by that early, formative experience. His approach offers a deeply pragmatic framework for anyone navigating real estate in today’s uncertain climate. In an era of overpromised alpha and fragile capital stacks, Kelly-Rand's doctrine is a study in restraint, structure, and staying power. From the Heart of Lehman to the Edges of Risk Kelly-Rand joined Lehman Brothers in 2006, just before the implosion, drawn by its dominance in the bond markets which he saw, even then, as the true engine behind real estate. While most looked to equity investment banks for leadership, he understood that the debt markets were where real decisions were made. His work centered on real estate financing and syndication, with a front-row view of a business model that was, in hindsight, structurally doomed. Lehman’s capital stack had been stretched too far – built on short-term funding to support long-term positions. As the firm accumulated assets, expanding its real estate exposure from $5 billion to over $36 billion, it did so with virtually no cushion. Liquidity was cheap and ubiquitous, but inherently unstable. When securitization markets seized up, those long-term assets could not be offloaded without catastrophic discounts to book value. And because any sale would have forced a full repricing of the entire book, no sale could be tolerated. Lehman was stuck – and the system broke. That lesson remains central to Kelly-Rand’s thinking today. The real issue wasn’t the quality of the assets; it was the fragility of the structure behind them. Risk wasn’t in the deal. It was in the funding. Rebuilding from the Ground Up In the years that followed, Kelly-Rand transitioned from the institutional capital markets to operating in the private lending space. He co-founded RD Advisors not just to chase yield, but also to build a firm capable of weathering downside scenarios – starting with a clean-sheet design of its capital strategy. The fund today focuses exclusively on senior secured debt, kept short in duration and conservatively underwritten. The business avoids the artificial stability of interest reserves or payment-in-kind structures that mask actual performance. Instead, it emphasizes cash-paying borrowers and short-term duration to preserve optionality and liquidity. Leverage is kept modest by design, with loan-to-value ratios structured around exit values that tolerate declining markets. Crucially, every deal is evaluated with a focus on capital preservation. Underwriting is done not with optimism, but with contingency: would the fund be comfortable owning the asset if they had to should a borrower walk? If the answer is anything but a clear yes, the deal doesn’t proceed. This mentality isn’t just prudent, it’s essential. The goal is to never rely on someone else’s execution for one’s own capital security. And that institutional memory from the GFC sits the core of the process. Avoiding the Illusion of Alpha Much of what passes for outperformance in today’s real estate environment is simply leverage in disguise. Sponsors show high IRRs, but beneath them is a capital structure dependent on favorable refis or asset appreciation that may no longer be achievable. That’s not skill, it’s exposure. Kelly-Rand’s fund’s returns, by contrast, are deliberately boring. They are stable, predictable, and quarterly. It’s a feature, not a bug. In fact, Kelly-Rand views volatility as a symptom of poor underwriting or misaligned structure, not a badge of aggressive performance. He’s wary, too, of the growing interest in ‘loan-to-own’ strategies, particularly among opportunistic capital looking to buy defaulted notes in the hopes of acquiring assets at a discount. While technically accurate – private credit can convert into equity when things go wrong – he emphasizes that building a business around that premise introduces operational complexity, execution risk, and volatility that neither he nor his investors are seeking. Today’s Market Echoes the Last Crisis What concerns Kelly-Rand most now is how little has changed in institutional behavior since the last crisis – and how closely today’s market echoes that of 2007. There is the same ...
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