Andrew Tilke
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Command Failure in War: Psychology and Leadership
- De: Philip Langer, Robert Pois
- Narrado por: Tim Welch
- Duración: 12 h y 45 m
- Versión completa
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General
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Narración:
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Historia
Why do military commanders fail at crucial moments of their careers? Robert Pois and Philip Langer, one a historian, the other an educational psychologist, study seven cases of military command failures, from Frederick the Great at Kunersdorf to Hitler’s invasion of Russia. While the authors recognize the value of psychological theorizing, they do not believe that one method can cover all the individuals, battles, or campaigns under examination. Instead, they judiciously take a number of psycho-historical approaches in hope of shedding light on the behaviors of commanders during war.
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Challenging, but worthwhile experience
- De Alek en 08-03-18
- Command Failure in War: Psychology and Leadership
- De: Philip Langer, Robert Pois
- Narrado por: Tim Welch
Informative but Technical
Revisado: 12-01-20
The text attempts to combine a psychological, social scientific approach, to the humanitarian study of history. It does this by analyzing individual military leaders across multiple time periods. From Frederick the Great, to Napoleon Bonaparte. American civil war general George McClellan and later leaders such as Stalin and Adolf Hitler. In concept, reading through these historical legends and discovering how their individual psychology effects their decisions would appear interesting. However, the authors failed to properly execute this idea and the book at times merely drones about historical facts of individuals with complex psychological concepts inserted periodically. It would appear that the psychologist, is a Gestaltist who attempts to combine historical evidence to support the Gestaltist assertion that the sum whole of an organization or event takes precedence over every little detail at play. While the historian provides the listener with every little detail at play for the psychologist to sum it all up at an organizational level, using ideas such as psychological field theory in combination with the leaders. Perhaps I am wrong, and interpreted their work incorrectly, I may have and part of that is due to how it was written. Overall the book lacks structure, consistency and though I appreciate the content and ideas discussed, the academic authors should take Journalism courses and modify their writing styles in order to make such a wonderful idea more enjoyable to listen or read. The narrator of the book has a smooth voice and attempts to spice up banal paragraphs with passionate flair, but fails, through no fault of his own, but through the fault of the writers. In short, I recommend this book if you are someone well versed in psychology and warfare. If you are not, I would read at your own risk or challenge. It is not introductory, it is a little more advanced, and is certainly helpful if you are someone who has academic experience in either field but is not the most riveting book for someone trying to listen to (what could be)an interesting combination of history and psychology.
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