Uri Pilichowski
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Presidents in Crisis
- Tough Decisions inside the White House from Truman to Obama
- De: Michael K. Bohn
- Narrado por: Kevin Stillwell
- Duración: 12 h y 23 m
- Versión completa
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General4 out of 5 stars 33
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Narración:4.5 out of 5 stars 28
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Historia4 out of 5 stars 29
In Presidents in Crisis, a former director of the Situation Room takes the listener inside the White House during 17 grave international emergencies handled by the presidents from Truman to Obama: from North Korea's invasion of South Korea to the revolutions of the Arab Spring, and from the 13 days of the Cuban Missile Crisis to the taking of American diplomats hostage in Iran and George W. Bush's response to the attacks of September 11, 2001.
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4 out of 5 stars
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Thought Provoking Analysis
- De Jean en 10-02-16
- Presidents in Crisis
- Tough Decisions inside the White House from Truman to Obama
- De: Michael K. Bohn
- Narrado por: Kevin Stillwell
Don’t read this book
Revisado: 11-21-22
Book Review: Presidents in Crises by Michael Bohn
I enjoy reading books on American Presidents and the events of their administrations. Even more enjoyable than books on a President and their administration, I enjoy meta-books on many presidencies and themes that compare different administrations and how they handled similar situations.
I was looking forward to Michael Bohn’s examination of how different American Presidents handled crises they faced during their administrations. Unfortunately I was disappointed by this book. Its examination of each crises is superficial, it doesn’t quote sufficient facts and is riddled with inaccuracies. No matter how disappointing a book is I rarely stop reading in the middle - I couldn’t even finish this book.
I do not recommend this book.
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Master of the Game
- Henry Kissinger and the Art of Middle East Diplomacy
- De: Martin Indyk
- Narrado por: Simon Vance
- Duración: 25 h
- Versión completa
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General4.5 out of 5 stars 61
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Narración:5 out of 5 stars 53
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Historia4.5 out of 5 stars 53
More than 20 years have elapsed since the United States last brokered a peace agreement between the Israelis and Palestinians. In that time, three presidents have tried and failed. Martin Indyk - a former United States ambassador to Israel and special envoy for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in 2013 - has experienced these political frustrations and disappointments firsthand.
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3 out of 5 stars
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Sad in its lack of creativity
- De Uri Pilichowski en 11-16-21
- Master of the Game
- Henry Kissinger and the Art of Middle East Diplomacy
- De: Martin Indyk
- Narrado por: Simon Vance
Sad in its lack of creativity
Revisado: 11-16-21
I can’t remember the last time I enjoyed a book as much as this one. Indyk is a great writer and his knowledge on diplomacy and especially diplomacy related to the Israeli-Arab conflict is well past expert level. There are many books written by insiders, and there are many books written by outsiders about insiders. It is rare to find a book by one insider (Indyk) reviewing another insider (Kissinger). Indyk’s research is remarkable. He obviously spent an enormous amount of time and effort into this book, and it shows. The beauty of this book is Indyk’s connecting Kissinger’s diplomatic attempts with Indyk’s own twenty years later. The constant “flashforwards” give a real sense of diplomacy and attempts at ending the Israeli-Arab conflict over the past five decades. If you are a follower of the US-Israel relationship, politics, diplomacy and/or history, I highly recommend this book, you will learn many new things and enjoy it along the way.
Indyk’s theses is the book is that Kissinger never thought an attempt to solve the Israeli-Arab conflict in one shot could work. Kissinger felt a step by step process was the only successful path to peace. Indyk seems to agree with Kissinger that gradualism is the better approach and admits that when he was Ambassador and part of the negotiating teams he took the opposite approach and repeatedly tried for a a comprehensive peace deal. He seems to admit his own mistake and says gradualism is the better approach.
As much as I enjoyed this book I was frustrated at Indyk’s refusal to perceive that the failed attempts at peace by American diplomats, Arab and Israeli leaders weren’t because of poor process, missed opportunities, bad timing or leaders who refused to compromise, but because the foundation at all attempts at solving the Israeli-Arab-Palestinian conflict have been based on an impossible end – two states for two people – that neither side wants nor thinks possible. Indyk and his State Department colleagues (those before and after him) have always assumed what the end looked like, and then tried to pressure, cajole, encourage both sides to get there. Instead of an open ended process where both sides negotiate a final outcome, the push has been to get to a place no one wants to go and get frustrated when they can’t get there.
It’s obvious to any non-biased observer that the two-state solution, a compromise where both Israel and the Palestinians get some of what they want, but not all of what they want, makes sense in the abstract, but when applied practically to the two sides is completely unrealistic and impossible. Yet diplomats like Indyk still insist on trying to make it work. They criticize anyone who refuses to go along with their process, not realizing that attempting the same failed process over and over is always going to result in failure.
The book’s ultimate failure lies in Indyk’s refusal to see that creative attempts like the Trump team’s novel approach are the only way the conflict is going to end. Indyk wrote that President Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and his refusal to recognize Jerusalem as a Palestinian capital, his planned approval of 30% of settlements in the West Bank along with its 133 settlements, only tarnished America’s role as a mediator in the conflict. He claims John Kerry made the last serious effort to solve the conflict. He discounts Trump’s attempts because they didn’t follow the two state solution’s failed script.
Indyk claims the only way forward to solving the conflict is that Israel must recognize it will become safer by withdrawing from land in Area C. The first step in a gradual process ala Kissinger must be Israel withdrawing from certain areas in area C. Once Israel begins withdrawing from more of area C, then both the United States and Israel could recognize a Palestinian state with undefined borders. Indyk outlines three steps to gradual peace making.
The first step is Israel recognizing a Palestinian state with borders to be recognized later. The second step is for Palestinians to gradually gain more control over the West Bank. The third step is for Israel to stop expanding and building settlements.
I was curious about Indyk’s three steps. They all focus on Israeli steps. The Palestinians in Indyk’s eyes have nothing to do to end the conflict, it’s all on Israel’s shoulders. The absurdity of thinking the Palestinians have nothing to do, and the end of the conflict is only being held up by Israel demonstrates why Indyk himself failed at his life’s mission. Although he hopes men like Kissinger and himself, who have toiled for decades with no results, have planted the seeds of an eventual peace deal, the truth is Indyk’s refusal to admit his own mistakes has brought failure and will never produce any success.
It’s sad and pathetic, and those are the feelings the book leaves its reader.
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